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THE FUTURE OF APPELLATE SENTENCING
REVIEW: BOOKER IN THE STATES
JOHN F. PFAFF*
I. INTRODUCTION
For much of our nation‘s history, appellate courts played almost no role in
criminal sentencing.
With trial judges possessing almost unfettered
sentencing discretion, there was little for appellate courts to review. That
began to change in the 1970s. States started to develop more structured
sentencing systems, and appellate courts were called on to ensure that trial
judges complied with the new regulations. But in a string of cases starting in
2000, the United States Supreme Court upended many of these sentencing
reforms ―like[] . . . a legal earthquake, a forty-car pileup, a bombshell, and a
bull in a china shop,‖ including the ability of appellate courts to police
compliance. 1 At first, the Supreme Court‘s decisions (culminating in Blakely
v. Washington2) appeared to confine appellate review to one narrow space, but
later cases (in particular United States v. Booker3) have awkwardly attempted
to reintroduce it more widely. The result: complete confusion, confusion that
continues to pervade sentencing throughout the country.
In this Article, I look at the theoretical implications of the Court‘s recent
contradictory sentencing cases, and I then examine how they are playing out
in practice at the state level. Though Booker purports to follow, not repudiate,
Blakely, its view of the role of appellate courts is wholly inconsistent with
Blakely‘s view. Many states have sidestepped this contradiction by simply
following Blakely and ignoring the option laid out in Booker. But at least
three states have chosen to pass through the door opened by Booker. Their
experiences allow us to examine the implications of Booker and Blakely for
state sentencing outcomes and for appellate review in a post-Booker world
more generally. The results indicate that, by and large, Booker is a failure.
Despite its drafters‘ intentions, Booker does not meaningfully revitalize
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Michael O‘Hear and the
participants at the symposium for helpful comments. Andrew Owen and Jessica Sonpal provided
excellent research assistance. All errors are my own. In a departure from the formatting used
elsewhere in this symposium, this Article capitalizes the word ―guideline‖ uniformly for both state
and federal guidelines.
1. Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at CrossPurposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1086 (2005).
2. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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appellate review, but only reintroduces it in a rarely used form—and does so
in a deeply illogical way.
To demonstrate Booker‘s failure, it is first necessary to describe the state
sentencing systems developed since the 1970s that Blakely undermined. Of
central importance to the discussion here are ―presumptive‖ guidelines. These
guidelines established sets of facts that judges had to find to impose certain
sentences. For example, the statutory maximum for assault may have been
ten years, but guidelines would state that the default (or presumptive) sentence
was only five years, and a judge could impose something greater than five
only if he found certain aggravating factors (the defendant used a gun, for
example), and if he did not find mitigating factors (the defendant was, say, the
sole supporter of his children) which sufficiently offset any aggravators.
Such guidelines created two possible forms of substantive appellate
review. The first is what I will refer to as ―boundary maintenance.‖
Appellate courts could review the trial court‘s factual findings: Was there
sufficient evidence in the record for the aggravators and mitigators that the
trial judge found? Did the trial judge overlook any relevant factors? Did the
trial judge rely on factors that were legally impermissible? Under this type of
review, as long as the trial judge had sufficient support for the aggravators and
mitigators he used, then the appellate court would not disturb how that judge
had chosen to weigh them. The second type of review directly regulated the
judge‘s discretion: I will call this ―regulatory review.‖ Under regulatory
review, the appellate court could find that the trial judge‘s findings of
aggravators and mitigators were all correct, yet still reverse or remand the
sentence for being substantively unreasonable.
Clearly, regulatory review is a much more aggressive form of appellate
review, and appellate courts—at least in the states considered here—appear to
have preferred boundary maintenance to regulatory review. This is a critically
important development. As I show below, Blakely renders both boundary
maintenance and regulatory review constitutionally impermissible, and to the
extent that Booker reestablishes a form of review, it reinvigorates only
regulatory review—the type of review states prefer not to use.
Most of the states that have opted to follow Booker, however, have missed
this point. They have read Booker as bringing back a weaker form of preBlakely boundary maintenance. But it has not: Boundary maintenance
remains impossible even after Booker. What Booker creates is a confusing,
and perhaps unappealing, form of regulatory review. Interestingly, Bookerfollowing states have either implicitly or accidentally acknowledged this,
since their post-Booker boundary maintenance has become purely procedural
review.

2009]

BOOKER IN THE STATES

685

I have three goals in this Article. The first is to sketch out the competing
effects of Blakely, Booker, and the other recent Supreme Court sentencing
cases to lay bare just how confusing and self-contradictory the Supreme
Court‘s foray into sentencing law has been. Blakely‘s key holding was that
any fact required to impose a particular sentence could not be found by a
judge, but had to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, in the
hypothetical guidelines above, after Blakely a judge could not impose a
sentence above five years unless a jury (as opposed to the judge) found any
relevant aggravating factor, such as the use of a gun. Judicial fact-finding at
sentencing—and the appellate review of such practices—was effectively
killed. Boundary maintenance is clearly impossible following Blakely, but so
too is regulatory review. As I will point out, regulatory review effectively
creates boundary conditions, implying that the two types of review are
logically almost indistinguishable.
Booker attempted to roll back Blakely, but it did so awkwardly. The
Supreme Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which required
extensive judicial fact-finding, violated Blakely. Its remedy, however, was to
declare the guidelines voluntary but subject to appellate ―reasonableness
review.‖ Unfortunately, as Justice Scalia pointed out in Booker, these two
holdings (written by different majorities) are inherently self-contradictory.
Rigorous appellate review creates sets of facts that trial judges must find
before imposing a sentence. Once they do so, Blakely charges back into the
scene, forcing such fact-finding back onto a jury or requiring that the
common law rules developed by the appellate court be abrogated. Subsequent
efforts by the Court to clarify this paradoxical rule have failed, and thus they
have only added to the confusion.
Stephanos Bibas and Susan Klein, however, have argued that Booker does
create a viable review process. 4 Though they do not use the boundary
maintenance or regulatory review terms that I do, their argument effectively is
that Booker authorizes a form of blurry, case-specific totality-of-thecircumstances regulatory review. Though I believe that they are wrong
doctrinally and logically—as long as Blakely is good law, substantive review
of any sort is simply impossible—they could very well be right pragmatically.
If nothing else, the five Justices who signed off on Justice Breyer‘s
reasonableness-review opinion in Booker surely believed that it meant
something. That the illogical is constitutional, however, is disheartening.
The second goal of this Article is to examine what appellate review looks
like in the three states—Indiana, New Jersey, and Tennessee—that have opted

4. Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 784 (2008).
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to Booker-ize their guidelines. 5 The results suggest that Booker has had little
effect, and they also indicate why. Prior to Blakely, appellate courts in New
Jersey and Tennessee engaged almost exclusively in boundary maintenance,
and the state supreme court in New Jersey and the legislature in Tennessee
have interpreted Booker as reintroducing a weaker form of such review. But
even Bibas and Klein admit that such review remains impermissible postBooker, and appellate courts in those states have implicitly agree by reducing
boundary maintenance to purely procedural review, and thus steering clear of
any constitutional concerns.6
Indiana‘s experience differs from those in New Jersey and Tennessee, and
in the process it provides evidence that Bibas and Klein‘s theory may work in
practice. Unlike those in New Jersey and Tennessee, appellate courts in
Indiana engaged in both boundary maintenance and regulatory review prior to
Blakely. Following Booker, boundary maintenance in Indiana, like that in
New Jersey and Tennessee, has been reduced to a purely procedural process.
But its regulatory review has continued unimpeded. In fact, there is not a
single case in Indiana that even discusses the possibility that regulatory
review could be—as I believe it must be—unconstitutional under Blakely.
Thus, at least one state has successfully preserved substantive appellate
review by (implicitly) drawing the very distinction laid out by Bibas and
Klein.
The third goal of this Article, then, is to consider whether this type of
regulatory review is appealing. As I will demonstrate, while Booker-ized
regulatory review is able to accomplish some of the goals that motivated
states to adopt guidelines, it is antithetical to other guideline aims: where
guidelines sought to inject clarity and objectivity into sentencing, totality-ofthe-circumstances regulatory review works only if it is opaque and subjective.
So we must ask whether the returns to such review justify the costs. The
evidence base is currently too weak to answer the question in any substantial
way, but I highlight some of the important questions that states should ask
before they attempt to follow in Booker‘s footsteps.
This Article is organized as follows: Part II describes the sentencing
reforms of the past thirty years and examines the effects of the Supreme
Court‘s recent adventure into sentencing policy. Part III then discusses why
Booker review has failed in New Jersey and Tennessee but succeeded in
5. California presently purports to follow Booker as well. However, California‘s current
sentencing law derives from stopgap emergency legislation subject to a short sunset provision.
Given the fiscal and criminal justice turmoil in that state, the future of sentencing in California is
unclear, so I do not consider it here.
6. Even Justice Scalia, the strongest opponent of post-Blakely appellate review, acknowledges
that purely procedural review remains permissible. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 378–84
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
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Indiana, and it uses the experiences in those states to clarify what Bookercompliant review must look like. And Part IV lays out the challenging
questions that states must answer before adopting Booker‘s remedy.
II. SENTENCING REFORM AND THE SUPREME COURT
It is easy to summarize the first two hundred years of appellate sentencing
review in the United States: there was none. The criminal justice regime,
wedded in theory, if not always in practice, to the goal of rehabilitating the
spirit (through the early 1800s) or the psyche (since the early 1800s),
traditionally vested in judges and parole boards almost limitless discretion at
sentencing. Doctors do not treat patients for a fixed number of days and then
release them regardless of whether they are cured; so too, the theory went,
with the rehabilitation of offenders. Illustrative of this type of sentencing
system was California‘s old robbery statute, which allowed a judge to impose
a sentence ranging from one year to life. 7
Given the tremendous amount of discretion delegated to trial judges and
parole boards, there was little for appellate or supreme courts to oversee. If
nothing else, as Kevin Reitz points out, with no substantive law of sentencing
to use for guidance, and with trial judges rarely, if ever, required to explain
themselves, appellate courts had no real record to review. 8 Moreover, as the
Supreme Court made clear in Williams v. New York,9 as long as the trial court
sentenced within the discretionary realm granted to it by an indeterminate
sentence regime, the decision was simply not reviewable.
In the 1970s, however, the indeterminate system began to collapse as
states across the country modified these regimes. 10 And by 2000, the
Supreme Court in turn started to take an interest in the constitutionality of
some of these developments. The next section describes the sentencing
innovations adopted by the states and the effect of the Court‘s recent decisions
on them—and on the role of appellate courts in particular.

7. See Ex parte Jordan, 212 P. 913 (Cal. 1923).
8. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of
Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1445 (1997).
9. 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949).
10. Though this is a point beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that the loss of
faith in judges‘ judgment coincided with a decline in trust of expertise more generally and with the
rise of the ―actuarial turn.‖ See John F. Pfaff, A Plea for More Aggregation: The Looming Threat to
Empirical Legal Scholarship 23 (Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1444410, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444410. The development of guidelines and other forms of
structured sentencing is thus part of a broader move to regulate often-problematic discretion.
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A. The Fall of Indeterminacy and the Rise of Structured Sentencing
Indeterminacy began to collapse under multiple vectors of attack.11 First,
Americans lost faith in the very idea of rehabilitation, adopting a ―Nothing
Works!‖ attitude toward rehabilitative interventions. 12 Second, indeterminacy
was opposed by conservatives for being soft on crime, and by liberals for
exacerbating racial tensions. And third, judges themselves assailed it for
being abused by their fellow judges.13 For our purposes here, the merits of
these concerns are irrelevant; what matters is that they encouraged a shift
away from rehabilitation toward deterrence, just deserts, and incapacitation,
and as a result they pushed numerous states away from indeterminacy.
The result has been a wide range of reforms that vary from state to state.
States have adopted mandatory minimums, abolished parole, implemented
truth-in-sentencing laws (which require certain inmates to serve a large
fraction of their sentences, usually 85%, before release is possible), and
imposed two- and three-strike laws. In this Article, I focus on perhaps the
most important sentencing innovation: sentencing guidelines.
Between 1970 and 2004, twenty-six states adopted some form of
sentencing guidelines, although two later eliminated them. Eight states
adopted ―determinate sentencing laws‖ (DSLs), ten adopted ―presumptive‖
sentencing guidelines, and eight adopted ―voluntary‖ guidelines. 14 DSLs and
presumptive guidelines differ only in style, not substance. In both cases, the
guidelines—I will use ―presumptive guidelines‖ to refer to both presumptive
guidelines and DSLs—set default sentences or ranges from which a judge
cannot depart (either up or down) without making some sort of additional
11. David Garland provides one of the more detailed and provocative accounts of the changes
taking place in criminal law in the 1970s and 1980s. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 53–64 (2001). For a survey of
these arguments, see also John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following
Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235, 241–46 (2006).
12. The article often cited as the catalyst for this movement is Robert Martinson, What Works?
Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974). Subsequent efforts to point
out the flaws in Martinson‘s work failed to gain traction. See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 11, at 58,
64; Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, From Nothing Works to What Works: Changing
Professional Ideology in the 21st Century, 81 PRISON J. 313 (2001).
13. Perhaps the most famous example here is by Judge Marvin E. Frankel, in his CRIMINAL
SENTENCES : LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
14. The eight DSL states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Indiana, Illinois,
New Jersey, and New Mexico. The ten presumptive guideline states are Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington, with Florida
adopting and then repealing its presumptive guidelines during this period. The eight voluntary
guideline states are Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin (which
briefly repealed then readopted its guidelines), with Louisiana adopting and then repealing its
voluntary guidelines. Since 2004, Washington, D.C. has adopted voluntary guidelines as well. It
should also be pointed out that North Carolina started as a DSL state in the 1970s, but converted its
DSLs to presumptive guidelines in 1994. See generally Pfaff, supra note 11, at 240–46.
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factual finding, such as the defendant used a gun during the crime (an
aggravating factor) or was operating under duress (a mitigating factor).
Imposing a sentence outside the guideline range without the appropriate facts,
or imposing the default range despite the presence of aggravators or
mitigators, was grounds for appeal by either the state or the defendant,
although most states adopted a fairly deferential approach. 15
Voluntary guidelines are similar to presumptive guidelines with one key
difference: judges are simply encouraged, not required, to follow them, and
there is no error—and thus no grounds for appeal—if the trial judge declines
to do so. Statutes in Virginia and Maryland, for example, state that the failure
to follow the guidelines or any of their procedural requirements (such as filing
an explanation for departures) is not appealable. 16 Other states, such as
Delaware, allow for some appellate review, but it is essentially procedural: As
long as the trial judge takes notice of relevant factors, the appellate court will
not set aside the sentence. 17
The development of guidelines changed the role of appellate courts. In
states using presumptive guidelines, appellate courts had a new task: ensuring
that the trial courts followed the guidelines, whether through boundary
maintenance or regulatory review. The need for such oversight varied from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. If nothing else, appellate oversight was surely
more important in jurisdictions adopting prescriptive as opposed to
descriptive guidelines. 18 But regardless, appellate courts found themselves
playing an important role in reviewing sentencing outcomes. Some evidence
suggests that when compared to judges in states with voluntary guidelines or
no guidelines at all, judges operating under presumptive guidelines sentenced
more consistently and relied less on impermissible factors such as the
defendant‘s race and sex; the threat of appellate reversal surely played some
role in this.19
15. See, e.g., State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149, 157–58 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). For cases from
New Jersey and Tennessee, see infra Part III.A.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(F) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., [CRIM. PROC.] § 6-211(b)
(LexisNexis 2008).
17. See White v. State, No. 442, 2002, 2002 WL 31873703, at *1 (Del. Dec. 20, 2002); see also
Smith v. United States, 837 A.2d 87, 100 (D.C. 2003).
18. Descriptive guidelines attempt to mimic how the average judge sentenced in pre-guidelines
days. The goal of such guidelines is to facilitate the judges‘ own desires to sentence consistently, and
thus appellate oversight may not be particularly important. Prescriptive guidelines, however, seek to
change how judges sentence. For example, assume that the average judge imposed five-year
sentences for assault. Descriptive guidelines would set the presumptive sentence at five years, while
prescriptive would set it at, say, two or ten, depending on whether the legislature is concerned about
resource management or leniency. Distinguishing the types of jurisdiction can be tricky, however.
The federal guidelines, for example, purported to be descriptive, but they were clearly prescriptive.
19. See Pfaff, supra note 11, at 274–76. My results do not isolate the particular importance of
appellate review.
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To make the implications of Blakely and Booker clear to those who may
not spend much time studying guidelines, a simple story can demonstrate how
guidelines worked, and thus how Blakely and Booker undermined them. 20 In
1998, in the midst of a bitter divorce proceeding in Washington State, Ralph
Blakely kidnapped his wife, Yolanda, tying her up with duct tape and forcing
her at knifepoint into a box in his truck. He also coerced his thirteen-year-old
son to follow him by threatening to harm Yolanda with a shotgun. The son
escaped and called for help, and Blakely was arrested shortly thereafter. He
ultimately pled guilty to, among other things, second-degree kidnapping with
a firearm.
Had Blakely committed his crime prior to July 1, 1984—the date
Washington State‘s sentencing guidelines went into effect—he would have
been sentenced under an indeterminate sentencing regime. The maximum
sentence for second-degree kidnapping was ten years, and the statutory
maximum was the maximum sentence any defendant faced; the judge had
substantial discretion for setting the minimum. 21 Blakely thus could have
been sentenced to ―one year to ten years in prison,‖ with the actual date of
release determined by the parole board, which itself possessed significant
discretionary powers. This type of indeterminacy defined sentencing in all
states prior to the 1970s, and it is the kind of regime in which appellate courts
play almost no role.
But by committing his crime after July 1, 1984, Blakely faced a much
different outcome. The statutory maximum for second-degree kidnapping
remained ten years. But under Washington State‘s guidelines, the standard
range for this offense was forty-nine to fifty-three months, and the judge
could depart from it only if he made specific additional factual findings, either
aggravating (for upward departures) or mitigating (for downward); the state‘s
statutes provided illustrative lists of such factors. Importantly, such factfinding was required, and failure to find and report adequate facts was
grounds for appeal by prosecution and defense alike. In Blakely‘s case, the
judge found that Blakely acted with ―deliberate cruelty‖ and sentenced him to
ninety months in prison, well below the statutory maximum but also well
above what the judge could have imposed without making additional findings.
Though unsuccessful, Blakely at least had grounds for challenging both the
factual basis and the substantive merit of his sentence. 22

20. The facts here are taken from Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 298–300 (2004).
21. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.011(1) (2003 & Supp. 2008–2009).
22. See State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149, 159 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). Like most of the state courts
discussed here, Washington appellate courts engaged primarily in boundary maintenance, refusing to
regulate a trial court‘s otherwise-valid discretion unless ―no reasonable judge would have imposed
the same sentence.‖ Id.
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Though the design of guidelines—as well as that of mandatory
minimums, strike laws, truth-in-sentencing laws, and other structural
devices—varied from state to state, the general move toward greater structure
was a consistent theme during the last three decades of the twentieth century.
By the 1990s, no state relied solely on indeterminate sentencing procedures.
This shift, however, captured the attention of the Supreme Court and
ultimately led to the confusion we find ourselves in today.
B. The Court Charges Forward: Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely
With the rise of structured sentencing, the Supreme Court abandoned its
traditionally laissez-faire attitude toward sentencing. The Supreme Court‘s
particular concern was not so much that judicial discretion was being limited,
but the way in which that was taking place. It was troubled by the fact that
indeterminacy was constrained by requiring judges, as opposed to juries, to
make factual findings. As we will see, the result is ironic: Afraid that too
much power was transferred from the jury to the judge (by imposing limits on
the judges), the Supreme Court handed down a string of opinions that
encouraged states to lift the limits on judges.23
The first key case is Apprendi v. New Jersey.24 Charles Apprendi, Jr., a
white man, pled guilty to various weapons charges after firing several bullets
into the house of a black neighbor. The charges carried statutory maximums
of ten years. At the time, however, New Jersey possessed a hate-crime statute
that allowed a judge to impose a sentence of up to twenty years if the judge
(not the jury) found that the crime was motivated by certain types of animus,
and the judge accordingly sentenced Apprendi to twelve years in prison. The
Supreme Court threw out Apprendi‘s aggravated sentence on grounds that it
violated the Sixth Amendment: ―[A]ny fact,‖ the Court held, ―that increases
the penalty . . . beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ 25 Thus, the maximum
sentence the judge could have given Apprendi was ten years.
The logic of Apprendi is clear. Imposing a sentence above the maximum
set by the statute is akin to sentencing the defendant for a different crime than
the one for which he was convicted. But while it targeted a legitimate
concern, Apprendi ran the risk of simply being a drafting rule. Consider the
following two regimes: In Regime One, there are two offenses, ―second23. As two members of Ohio‘s sentencing commission bitterly quipped: ―Did you hear the one
about the defendant whose right to a jury trial was vindicated by giving judges more power?‖ See
Memorandum from David Diroll, Executive Director, and Scott Anderson, Staff Attorney, Ohio
Criminal Sentencing Comm‘n, to Judges and Other Interested Parties 1 (Mar. 28, 2006),
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Boards/Sentencing/resources/Publications/foster.pdf.
24. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
25. Id. at 490.
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degree drug trafficking,‖ which carries a maximum sentence of five years and
applies to defendants who sell no more than fifty grams of cocaine, and ―firstdegree drug trafficking,‖ which carries a maximum sentence of ten years and
applies to defendants who sell more than fifty grams of cocaine. In Regime
Two, there is just one offense, ―drug trafficking,‖ with a statutory maximum
of ten years, but a guideline provision that states a judge cannot impose a
sentence of more than five years without finding that the defendant sold at
least fifty grams of cocaine. According to Apprendi, a jury must find the
weight in Regime One, but a judge can make the finding in Regime Two. 26
In Ring v. Arizona,27 the Supreme Court effectively closed this loophole.
In Ring, the Supreme Court evaluated Arizona‘s death penalty procedures,
which required a judge to make certain factual findings before imposing the
death penalty. Importantly, in Ring the statutory maximum is the death
penalty, so unlike in Apprendi, in imposing the death penalty the trial judge in
Ring was sentencing within the statutory maximum. Nonetheless, the Court
held this sentence to be improper as well, stating again that such required factfinding had to be made by a jury. And the Court explicitly stated that its
holding was general, not death penalty-specific.
Although presumptive guidelines survived Apprendi—as the drug-statute
hypothetical makes clear—they could not survive Ring.28 Judges operating
under presumptive guidelines were engaged in the exact same conduct as the
judge in Ring: adjusting sentences upward but within the statutory limits only
after making required factual findings. And in Blakley v. Washington, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the implications of Ring, declaring presumptive
guidelines unconstitutional for exactly this reason. Specifically, any fact
required to impose a higher sentence had to be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Blakely‘s is a doctrinal view of the Sixth Amendment.29 When the state
26. The majority in Apprendi—which is also the majority in Blakely and in the merits part of
Booker—is Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, and Thomas. Though at first a strangeseeming alliance, Walter Dellinger has pointed out that it reflects not the usual right/left split on the
Court but a doctrinal/pragmatic rift. See Walter Dellinger, A Supreme Court Dialogue, SLATE, June
28, 2004, http://slate.com/id/2102895/entry/2103016/. That a doctrinal ruling leads to pragmatic
confusion is perhaps to be expected. Noting the nature of this divide helps explain why—as I will
argue below—Booker is such a chaotic and self-contradictory opinion: one half of the opinion is
written by doctrinalists, the other by pragmatists.
27. 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
28. The inevitable doom of presumptive guidelines is made clear by the fact that a federal
district court judge declared the presumptive Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional a week
before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Blakely, based solely on Apprendi and Ring. See
United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 300–01 (D. Mass. 2004).
29. Though predominantly a doctrinal opinion, there was a pragmatic concern motivating it as
well, but this concern was misplaced. Scalia expressed concern that states could set the statutory
maximum for low-level crimes very high and then make the commission of separate felonies
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creates an expectation, that expectation can be broken only by the jury. A
statutory maximum is one such way of creating an expectation, but so too is a
guideline cap.30 So Blakely held that states can continue to use presumptive
guidelines, but all aggravating facts must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.31
The Court made it clear, though, that judicial fact-finding under voluntary
guidelines does not run afoul of Blakely.32 The majority favorably cited
Williams for the proposition that as long as the state does not create any
expectation, the judge is free to make any findings he wants and to impose
any sentence (within the maximum and minimum) that he fancies. This
implicit support for voluntary guidelines proves important down the road.
Blakely has effectively foreclosed any possibility of substantive appellate
oversight—whether boundary maintenance or regulatory review—unless the
jurisdiction uses sentencing juries, and even in that setting, Blakely restricts it
severely. Assume, for example, that based on aggravating factors found by a
jury, a judge imposed an elevated eight-year sentence for a crime with a
statutory maximum of ten years but a presumptive sentence of five years.
Boundary maintenance here would require the appellate court to reverse the
factual findings of a jury, something that appellate courts are generally loathe
to do, and so such review will likely be rare in the presence of sentencing
juries.33 But an appellate court could engage in regulatory review, and hold
aggravating factors, thus allowing the defendant to effectively be sentenced for a crime for which he
was never convicted, gutting the Sixth Amendment. For example, a state could set the maximum
sentence for theft at life without parole but define the default range as three to five years. The
guidelines could then state that a judge could impose a sentence of twenty years or more only if he
found by a preponderance that the defendant committed a murder during the course of the theft. The
defendant has essentially been sentenced for murder, even though the charge need never be brought
before the jury.
This is a fair concern—at the time Blakely was decided, a federal case was pending on appeal
involving a sentence for credit card fraud that was aggravated because of an uncharged murder—but
it had nothing to do with the case before the Court. Washington State‘s statutes, like those of many
states, explicitly stated that conduct constituting a separate offense could not be used as an
aggravating factor. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.370(3) (2003) (now found at § 9.94A.530(3)
(Supp. 2008–2009)). The federal system, however, had embraced this type of ―real offense‖
sentencing regime wholeheartedly, and in both Blakely‘s majority and dissenting opinions there is a
strong sense that the Justices were not actually debating Washington‘s guidelines, but rather the
federal guidelines.
30. One could make both doctrinal and pragmatic arguments for why a statutory maximum and
a guideline range are not similar expectations, but the Court did not do so.
31. Blakely is asymmetric. Aggravating facts must be found by a jury, but mitigating facts can
still be found by a judge. The logic is that the Sixth Amendment is designed to protect the defendant
from state severity, not state lenience. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004).
32. See generally Pfaff, supra note 11.
33. But not impossible. For example, in many jurisdictions a factor that is an element of a
separate crime cannot be used as an aggravator, so an appellate court could toss an aggravator found
by a jury that violates this principle, even if it did not want to review the evidentiary support for
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that the eight-year sentence was unreasonable given the factors found by the
jury. Such a decision, however, would be confusing: the judge would know
that future juries would need to find more facts than the current jury did, but
the judge would not necessarily know what those facts are. Nonetheless,
regulatory review can exist in this context.
But for jurisdictions that do not wish to rely on sentencing juries, either
type of substantive review is impossible. Without sentencing juries,
jurisdictions are forced to rely on voluntary guidelines. 34 Such guidelines
were already inimical to boundary maintenance review, and Blakely only
strengthens this effect. To reverse because, say, the trial court relied on an
improper aggravator would imply that the guidelines are not wholly
voluntary—unless such a reversal were purely procedural—and thus would
trigger Blakely‘s concerns about jury rights.35
Regulatory review is likewise impossible in voluntary guideline regimes
after Blakely. As in the sentencing jury example above, a reversal for
unreasonableness would imply that there is some extra fact out there that the
trial court was required to find but had not. But in the absence of sentencing
juries, there is no one to make this finding. In such a setting, the appellate
courts are either incredibly powerful—by reversing sentences they can
undermine the voluntary guideline system and force the state to adopt
sentencing juries—or absolutely powerless, unable to reverse on any sort of
substantive ground. The latter outcome is by far the more likely. 36
Though perhaps troubling from a policy perspective, Blakely laid down a
clear and intelligible rule. In its subsequent efforts to shift fact-finding back
to the trial judge, the Supreme Court undermined this rule without developing
a similarly intelligible alternative.
C. A Partial Retreat: Booker, Rita, Gall, and Ice
Blakely represents the high-water mark for the aggressive interpretation of
the Sixth Amendment begun in Apprendi. In three follow-up cases—
United States v. Booker, United States v. Rita, and Oregon v. Ice—the Court
has retreated from the hard line it took in Blakely. In a fourth case,
United States v. Gall, however, the Court still seems committed to the Blakely
specific findings.
34. Or return to indeterminacy, which as we have seen does not support much if any review.
35. Procedural boundary maintenance could survive Blakely. Were an appellate court to
remand, not alter, a sentence because the trial court relied on an unsupported or impermissible
aggravator, Blakely is not immediately implicated. The appellate court would have to make it clear,
however, that the trial court remains free to impose the exact same sentence as before with a different
explanation.
36. Especially in the long run. That the state adopted voluntary guidelines over jury sentencing
indicates a preference for the former. Were the appellate courts to start imposing jury fact-finding,
the legislature would likely strip them of their review power.
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view. It should thus come as little surprise that states are somewhat baffled
about what options remain open to them.
Booker,37 which confronted the question of whether the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines violated Blakely, is likely one of the most selfcontradictory opinions in the United States Reports. The federal guidelines
relied on required judicial fact-finding more than any other sentencing regime
in the nation, and in the merits half of the opinion, the same five-Justice
majority that handed down Apprendi and Blakely found the federal guidelines
unconstitutional.
The remedial half of the opinion was written by the dissenters from the
merits half along with Justice Ginsburg, the only Justice to sign on to both
halves of the opinion.38 Given that four of the authors of the remedial
majority dissented from the merits majority on the grounds that Blakely was
simply wrongly decided, 39 that Booker‘s remedy severely undermined Blakely
is as expected.
In Blakely, the Court left Washington‘s guidelines essentially untouched,
simply informing the state who the relevant fact finder had to be. Not so in
Booker. In Booker, the remedial majority severed two provisions from the
federal Code: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which made the guidelines binding, and
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which established the standard of review for sentencing
appeals. As a result, the federal guidelines now appear to be voluntary.
But not quite. The remedial majority held that while the guidelines are
voluntary, and while the statutory provision for review has been excised, a
standard of review nonetheless implicitly exists. 40 The Court thus declared
that the guidelines were voluntary but subject to ―reasonableness review.‖
Unfortunately, the Court declined to explain what this term means. Trial
judges are called on to make sure that sentences are consistent with the
punishment goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), but that provision is so
broad as to provide almost no guidance at all.41 Other than that, the remedial
37. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
38. It is unfortunate that Justice Ginsburg did not write her own opinion, since she is the lone
Justice who apparently saw a way to reconcile the two seemingly incompatible majority opinions.
39. The dissenters from the merits opinion essentially reiterated their opposition to Apprendi
and Blakely. They also made a stab at distinguishing Blakely from Booker on the grounds that the
federal guidelines were administrative rules, not statutes, but the argument is not convincing. First,
Blakely makes no reference about where the required fact-finding comes from. And second,
Washington State‘s guidelines were created by an administrative body and then adopted by the
legislature, so the distinction is purely academic at best and nonexistent at worst. For a history of
Washington‘s guidelines, see Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Powers and
Duties of the Commission, http://www.sgc.wa.gov/Informational/About_SGC.htm (last visited May
28, 2010).
40. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260.
41. Among the factors to be considered are ―the nature and circumstances of the offense‖ and
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majority simply stated that this was a type of review in which appellate courts
have traditionally engaged—albeit under a set of rules that Blakely eliminated
(a point the remedial majority failed to address). 42
This lack of guidance is disappointing, because creating reasonableness
review makes Booker logically untenable. As long as Blakely remains good
law, any sort of substantive review will ultimately prove self-contradictory
and self-defeating. As pointed out above, both boundary maintenance and
regulatory review create fact-finding requirements that trigger Blakely‘s jury
trial right. And while reasonableness review may be possible in a world with
extensive sentencing juries, Booker is explicitly about reasonableness review
of judicial, not jury, fact-finding.
In a recent paper, however, Stephanos Bibas and Susan Klein attempt to
reconcile Booker with Blakely.43 Their argument fails to overcome the illogic
of Booker, because that illogic is insurmountable. But it may nonetheless be
constitutionally correct, in that the distinction they draw—nonexistent as it
may be—is one that the Court will quite likely accept. Given its
constitutional strength, and the fact that it explains what we see taking place at
the state level, the argument deserves our attention.
Bibas and Klein argue that the totality-of-the-circumstances-type review
that the Court envisions for its reasonableness standard often ―cannot isolate a
specific fact or judgment that is necessary to justify the imposition of a
particularly high . . . sentence.‖44 They go on then to state that:
[A]n appellate court could not reverse a sentence as
unreasonably high . . . because of a specific fact, as that
would turn that fact into a jury issue. But it could reverse a
sentence because under the totality of circumstances, no
reasonable judge would impose this sentence. Appellate
courts would reverse sentences without pinpointing exactly
which facts and policies their reversals rested on. This vague
approach would resemble the old but still constitutional
model of unfettered sentencing discretion. Thus, there would
be no Sixth Amendment violation. 45
In short, they are arguing that while Blakely eliminates boundary
maintenance—the definition of particular facts that must be found—it does

of the defendant, the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense (just deserts), the need to deter, the
need to protect (incapacitate), and the need and ability to rehabilitate: in short, almost every
justification for punishment proposed over the past several centuries. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
42. Booker, 543 U.S. at 262–63.
43. Bibas & Klein, supra note 4.
44. Id. at 783.
45. Id. at 784.
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not foreclose regulatory review.
With all due respect to Bibas and Klein, who are among the most astute
scholars of sentencing today, I cannot accept their argument. First, Blakely
does not hold that any named fact necessary for a greater sentence must be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but just that any essential fact
must be found that way. At the risk of repeating myself, by reversing a
sentence as unreasonable an appellate court is saying that some extra fact was
needed; whether it is pinpointed or not is immaterial to Blakely. Second, the
presence of review means quite specifically that sentencing is not akin to
unfettered discretion. Some discretionary decisions will be reversed, and so
some trial courts will not always be able to accomplish what they desire.
Fetters very much exist.
Bibas and Klein‘s approach may also be normatively unappealing. One of
the key goals of structured sentencing is to inject greater transparency and
objectivity into sentencing decisions. It is troubling to save such a system by
imposing review that is intentionally vague and ill-defined—after all, a welldefined reversal would be boundary maintenance, which Bibas and Klein
admit is unconstitutional.
In the end, regulatory review cannot conceptually survive where boundary
maintenance is impermissible because they are not wholly distinct ideas.
Regulatory review is just a more sophisticated form of boundary maintenance.
We can think of boundary maintenance as ―unconditional boundary control‖
and regulatory review as ―conditional boundary control.‖ 46
Under
unconditional boundary control, once a judge finds certain facts on a
particular list, he is free to set a sentence within a particular range. It is a
lumpy, dichotomous approach. Conditional boundary control is more
sophisticated: conditional on the particular set of facts a judge has initially
found, he may need more facts to impose a particular sentence.
A simple, concrete example may clarify the relationship between the two.
Consider a guideline regime that includes a list of ten aggravators, not all of
which are equally severe. Let A1 be the most severe aggravator and A10 the
least; for each default sentencing range there is also an aggravated sentencing
range. In an unconditional, boundary maintenance-type regime, once the
judge finds an aggravator, he is free to impose any sentence in the aggravated
range. In a conditional, regulatory review-type regime, the quality of the
aggravators matter, but this can be phrased in boundary maintenance terms.
Conditional on finding A1 and A2, the judge is free to impose the highest
sentence, but conditional on finding only A9 and A10 he may be allowed to
46. There is no linguistic or logical difference between ―maintenance‖ and ―control.‖ I am
using ―control‖ here simply to prevent chaos were I to talk about boundary maintenance,
unconditional boundary maintenance, and conditional boundary maintenance.
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impose only a lower sentence within the aggravated range. This could be
framed as regulatory review—with only A9 and A10 the highest sentence is
unreasonable—or boundary maintenance, with different sets of aggravators
needed for different sentences within the aggravated range. Both boundary
maintenance and regulatory review are forms of substantive review, so it
makes sense that they are opposite sides of the same coin, with the difference
between them one of granularity. Boundary maintenance is no more detailed
than the guideline provisions, while regulatory review operates at a more
nuanced level. In the end, however, the implications of a reversal are roughly
the same under both.
Yet the (ephemeral) distinction between boundary maintenance and
regulatory review is one the Court may very well ultimately adopt, as
suggested in several subsequent cases it has handed down in an effort to
clarify Booker. In United States v. Gall, the Court stated that it is
―uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more
significant justification than a minor one,‖ 47 a claim wholly consistent with
the Bibas–Klein view of permissible regulatory review. 48 The Court‘s
implicit adoption of a Bibas–Klein approach is further strengthened by its
opinion in Rita, which held that appellate courts could create a presumption of
reasonableness for within-range sentences.
That the Court is willing to entertain artificial distinctions to limit
Blakely‘s reach is made strikingly apparent in Oregon v. Ice.49 In Ice, the
Court confronted a sentencing rule that required judicial fact-finding before a
judge could impose consecutive, as opposed to concurrent, sentences. The
Court upheld the rule, despite it being almost impossible to reconcile with
Blakely (as Scalia pointed out in a blistering dissent). Blakely‘s rule is a
general one, focusing not on required judicial fact-finding under guideline
systems, but on judicial fact-finding that results in longer sentences in general.
That Blakely involved sentencing guidelines is an immaterial detail. Thomas
Ice received a sentence longer than he otherwise could as the result of
required judicial fact-finding, and Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion is forced to
draw fine distinctions—in fact, arguably nonexistent ones—to circumvent
Blakely. It is quite conceivable that a majority of Justices could similarly

47. 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). Complicating this statement, though, is the fact that Gall held that
appellate courts could not create a presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the
guideline ranges, thus making the above quote seem more like dicta.
48. Not surprisingly, in his grudging concurrence, Justice Scalia pointed out that Gall still
requires some sort of fact-finding somewhere and thus still violates Blakely and the merits half of
Booker. Scalia concurred only because he gives stare decisis weight to Rita—from which he
dissented—and because he feels that the Supreme Court‘s rule in Gall will result in fewer
unconstitutional sentences than the appellate decision it reversed.
49. 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009).
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reconcile the Bibas–Klein proposal with Blakely.
In the end, the problem with Booker is that it is only a partial reversal of
Blakely, and an inept one at that. The dissenters from Apprendi and Blakely
apparently lacked the votes to reverse those opinions, but were able to sway
Justice Ginsburg to agree to what could be termed a ―modification.‖ Such
partial repeals are, unfortunately, not uncommon in the Supreme Court‘s
criminal law jurisprudence. Ronald Allen and Ethan Hastert in fact suggest
that they happen with surprising frequency. 50 Among their examples: mental
states are subject to constitutional oversight until they are not; 51 factual
presumptions are subject to scrutiny until they are not; 52 and perhaps most
famously, the Mullaney and Patterson cases that ultimately hold that the state
bears the burden of proof for every element of the crime, unless it drafts its
statutes carefully.53
The problem with such indirect attacks on an opinion is that it becomes
increasingly difficult to understand what the rule actually is. In many ways,
Mullaney and Patterson simply delegate tremendous discretion to the Court: it
is free to decide when a state has excessively shifted the burden of proof onto
the defendant. Rather than confront a bad (or at least disliked) decision headon, the Court often simply undermines it, but in doing so produces an
outcome far muddier than need be the case. So too with Blakely and Booker.
While the Court‘s post-Booker cases have focused almost exclusively on
federal sentencing, at least three states are currently developing Booker-esque
reasonable review standards of their own. Their experiences suggest that
post-Booker review which focuses on boundary maintenance (as is the case in
New Jersey and Tennessee, and to a lesser extent, Indiana) fails to restore any
sort of meaningful review, but that which adopts a more regulatory review
approach (as happens in Indiana) succeeds. In other words, the Bibas–Klein
distinction appears to be playing out at the state level. The next section
examines in more detail these state experiences.
III. BOOKER IN THE STATES: UNMAINTAINED BOUNDARIES AND
50. Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional
Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 195 (2005).
51. Compare United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) with Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) and United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
52. Compare Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 472 (1943) with United States v. Gainey, 380
U.S. 63, 70 (1965).
53. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703 (1975) (invalidating Maine‘s murder
statute) with Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 216 (1977) (upholding New York‘s). Simplifying
only slightly, the defect in Maine‘s statute was that it explicitly defined malice aforethought as an
element of the crime but put the burden of refuting it on the defendant. New York avoided that error
by not including its equivalent of malice aforethought in its murder provision, but instead made
proving its absence an affirmative defense (via an extreme emotional disturbance provision). In the
end, the statutory distinction is almost wholly semantic.
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ACCIDENTAL REGULATORY REVIEW
Blakely invalidated guideline systems in thirteen states. 54 Eight responded
by Blakely-izing their guidelines—seven by adopting sentencing juries and
one by making its guidelines wholly voluntary. 55 One of the thirteen has yet
to officially respond to Blakely.56 Indiana, New Jersey, and Tennessee (and
possibly California), however, have decided to follow Booker and have
converted their presumptive guidelines into voluntary guidelines subject to
some sort of reasonableness review.
In this section, I examine how Booker review has played out in Indiana,
New Jersey, and Tennessee. 57 Their experiences both highlight the confusion
that Booker has wrought and provide evidence of the viability of the Bibas–
Klein distinction. To summarize briefly: Appellate courts in New Jersey and
Tennessee engaged almost exclusively in boundary maintenance before
Blakely, and these two states have read Booker as restoring a weakened form
of such review. But boundary maintenance is at the heart of the Booker
paradox—even Bibas and Klein admit it cannot survive Blakely and Booker—
and though they never directly acknowledge the paradox, appellate courts in
these two states have reduced boundary maintenance to purely procedural
review. Appellate courts in Indiana, however, undertook both boundary
maintenance and regulatory review prior to Blakely. Boundary maintenance
review in Indiana, like that in New Jersey and Tennessee, has become nothing
more than procedural review, but its regulatory review continues as if nothing
has changed. In fact, there is not a single Indiana appellate or state supreme
court opinion that even raises the possibility that its regulatory review violates
Blakely. Given the similarity between Indiana‘s regulatory review and the
blurry totality-of-the-circumstances review advocated by Bibas and Klein,
Indiana‘s experiences provide some direct evidence that the Bibas–Klein
proposal may in fact be constitutionally viable.
A. Boundary Maintenance in New Jersey and Tennessee
Sentencing review practices in New Jersey and Tennessee were fairly
54. Supra note 14 listed seventeen states that had either DSLs or presumptive guidelines. But
for various technical reasons, those in four states—Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, and Pennsylvania—do
not run afoul of Blakely. I provide a more detailed explanation in Pfaff, supra note 11, at 240–46.
55. The seven sentencing jury states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota,
North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington. The voluntary guideline state is Ohio. See Pfaff, supra
note 11, at 240–46; Bibas & Klein, supra note 4, at 786 app. A at 799–801 tbls.II–IV. The Ohio
Supreme Court relied extensively on Booker, but only for the proposition that supreme courts can
modify sentencing statutes to make guidelines voluntary. It otherwise rejected the remedial
majority‘s remedy. State v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470, 496 (Ohio 2006).
56. As of this writing, New Mexico had not reached a solution.
57. As mentioned in supra note 5, the State of California‘s sentencing law remains ambiguous,
and I do not consider it in this Article.
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similar before Blakely and remain so after Booker. In effect, appellate courts
in both states engaged in boundary maintenance. Pre-Blakely review in
Tennessee was more finely grained and more aggressive, but for our purposes
here the distinctions are more superficial than substantive. And following
Booker, both states attempted to preserve boundary maintenance but failed.
Appellate courts do not directly acknowledge this failure, but it is clear from
their decisions that they have not been able to reconcile meaningful,
substantive boundary maintenance with Blakely. This section starts by
describing pre-Blakely review in the two states, and it then examines their
similar post-Booker experiences.
1. New Jersey and Tennessee Before Blakely
After almost a decade of debating the issue, New Jersey adopted a
determinate sentencing law in 1978.58 The law established a specific default
sentence for each degree of offense as well as an upper and lower bound
around that default. A judge could not impose a sentence above the default
without finding certain aggravating factors or below without finding
mitigating factors; the code provided an exhaustive list of these factors. 59
Appellate review followed a three-step process: the appellate court
determined whether (1) the proper guidelines had been followed; (2) there
was sufficient factual support for the aggravators and mitigators on which the
judge relied; and (3) the trial court ―clearly erred‖ by imposing a sentence that
could not be supported by any reasonable weighing of the aggravators and
mitigators.60 Steps (1) and (2) are clearly boundary maintenance conditions.
Step (3) is a form of regulatory review, but the bar was set so high that it was
rarely, if ever, used.61
Thus, appellate courts in New Jersey focused on boundary maintenance.
In State v. Thomas, for example, the appellate court remanded for
resentencing after pointing out that the trial court had aggravated a sentence
based on past offenses that the trial judge had earlier admitted were not very
serious.62 And in State v. Mirakaj,63 the appellate court remanded for
58. A detailed history of New Jersey‘s sentencing reform process is given in State v. Roth, 471
A.2d 370 (N.J. 1984).
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:44-1, 2C:43-6 (2005).
60. Roth, 471 A.2d at 387.
61. At least one New Jersey appellate judge noted the difficulty of reversing sentences that
satisfy boundary maintenance review. See Edwin H. Stern, Frustrations of an Intermediate
Appellate Judge (and the Benefits of Being One in New Jersey), 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 991–94
(2008).
62. In other words, the trial court‘s own statements suggested that the aggravators were not
―‗based upon findings of fact that are grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence.‘‖ 812
A.2d 409, 415–16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (quoting Roth, 471 A.2d at 386).
63. 632 A.2d 850, 851 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
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resentencing after holding that the trial court had improperly failed to find a
relevant mitigating factor. In both cases, the appellate courts were effectively
stating that the trial court lacked the right documentation to cross the border;
by remanding—the procedure appellate courts were strongly encouraged to
follow—the appellate courts avoided something more like regulatory review.
Pre-Blakely appellate review in Tennessee was likewise focused on
boundary maintenance, though the line between boundary maintenance and
regulatory review was blurrier because appellate courts resentenced rather
than remanded. Tennessee‘s Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989
established presumptive guidelines with appellate review. The conviction
offense and the defendant‘s criminal history determined a range, and for all
but the most serious felonies, the trial judge was to impose the minimum
sentence in the range unless he found that certain aggravating factors
dominated mitigating factors.64 Appellate courts reviewed sentences under a
―presumptive de novo‖ standard. The appellate court reviewed the sentence
de novo, but the trial court‘s sentence was presumptively correct as long as
the appellate court found that it had considered all relevant aggravators,
mitigators, and sentencing principles; absent such a finding review was
simply de novo.65
In practice, appellate review in Tennessee focused on the sufficiency of
the evidence—on boundary maintenance. An indicative case is State v.
Embry.66 When sentencing Charles Embry for rape, the trial court imposed a
sentence above the minimum after finding no mitigators and four aggravators,
including that the crime was committed with ―exceptional cruelty‖ and that
the victim‘s injuries were ―particularly‖ great. The appellate court held that
the record showed cruelty and harm, but neither exceptional cruelty nor
particularly great harm. In light of these findings (and skepticism about a
third aggravator), the court reduced the sentence from twelve years to ten,
which was still above the presumptive minimum of eight.67
At one level, this appears to be regulatory review, but upon closer
inspection it is actually more like boundary maintenance (though the
ambiguity illuminates the difficulty and ultimate artificiality of distinguishing
64. Pre-Blakely procedures are described in State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 342 (Tenn. 2008).
65. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-402(d) (2003); State v. Pierce, 138 S.W.3d 820, 826 (Tenn.
2004); State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991); State v. Shelton, 854 S.W.2d 116, 123
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
66. 915 S.W.2d 451, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, State v. Winfield,
23 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tenn. 2000).
67. For other instances of appellate courts eliminating some but not all aggravators as
insufficiently supported by the record and partially adjusting the sentence accordingly, see State v.
Spratt, 31 S.W.3d 587, 609 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (remanding rather than resentencing); State v.
Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 259–60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Claybrooks, 910 S.W.2d 868,
872–73 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
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the two types of review). What makes this type of review more boundary
maintenance than regulatory review is the appellate court‘s focus on the
specific missing factors. The appellate court adjusts the sentence only
because the trial court lacked all the aggravators the trial court thought it
possessed. The appellate court is not so much disagreeing with an otherwisevalid sentence (regulatory review), but is instead arguing that the sentence fell
in a region the trial court lacked the authority to enter (boundary
maintenance).
Tennessee‘s statutes appeared to vest its appellate courts with the right to
engage in even more thorough regulatory review by asking whether the trial
court properly weighed the aggravators and the mitigators.68 But Tennessee
courts viewed the weighing of factors as falling primarily within the trial
court‘s discretion;69 tellingly, zero pre-Blakely cases cite the relevant section
of Tennessee‘s code (section 40-35-401(b)(2)). There are some instances in
which appellate courts nonetheless reversed how trial courts weighed
aggravators and mitigators, but these appear to be rare. 70
2. New Jersey and Tennessee After Booker
Pre-Blakely appellate review in both New Jersey and Tennessee clearly
violated Blakely: their boundary maintenance effectively imposed on judges
fact-finding requirements that Blakely held only juries could undertake.
Consider the Embry case from Tennessee. Following the appellate court‘s
ruling, a trial court sentencing a defendant for rape would not be able to
impose a sentence above ten years without finding the one aggravator that
survived review plus at least one more aggravator, or a different set of
aggravators altogether. Either way, in a post-Blakely world, Embry would
define the statutory maximum for rape as at most ten years, absent additional
jury fact-finding.
Though both states responded to Blakely and Booker, they did so
differently. In New Jersey, the fix came from the state supreme court, which
in State v. Natale issued an opinion that parallels Booker in striking ways. 71
The court held that New Jersey‘s guidelines created unconstitutional judicial
fact-finding requirements, stated (like Booker) that the state legislature did not
intend for jury fact-finding but wanted sentencing to be conducted by judges,

68. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-401(b)(2) (2003); see also Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 344.
69. See, e.g., State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
70. One example is State v. Grissom, 956 S.W.2d 514, 519 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), in which
the appellate court reduced a sentence back to the presumptive minimum, stating that ―in our opinion
the abundance of mitigating evidence necessitates that the sentence be reduced back down to the
minimum.‖ Yet even this type of review can be seen as a form of boundary maintenance, given its
explicit reference to the number of mitigators.
71. 878 A.2d 724, 739 (N.J. 2005).
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excised (like Booker) the sections that made the guidelines presumptive, and
insisted (like Booker) that appellate courts would still play ―‗a central role‘‖
and that ―[s]entencing decisions will continue to be reviewed under our
established appellate sentencing jurisprudence.‖ 72 And like the Booker Court,
the court in Natale provided no meaningful guidance as to what ―established
appellate sentencing jurisprudence‖ meant.
In Tennessee, the legislature amended its guidelines in 2005 to comply
with Booker, rendering them voluntary but subject to appellate review. It is
clear that the drafters intended for review to be more than merely procedural,
since excessiveness or inconsistency with the purposes of punishment—
substantive factors—remain grounds for appeal.73
The drafters even
acknowledged that such review was perhaps unconstitutional under Blakely
until Booker (in their eyes) modified Blakely. 74 Today, the constitutionality of
Tennessee‘s revised statutes is not in doubt, given that they are cited
favorably in the Supreme Court‘s decision in Cunningham v. California.75
There is a striking feature of Tennessee‘s amendments that deserves
notice. In order to comply with (its interpretation of) Booker, the legislature
struck the guidelines‘ regulatory review provision that allowed appellate
courts to resentence when they felt that the trial judge had not properly
weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors.76 In other words, the
legislators felt that Booker required them to disavow the very type of review
that Bibas and Klein favor. If nothing else, such a contradiction lays bare
Booker‘s fundamental illogic.
Like the United States and New Jersey Supreme Courts, the Tennessee
Supreme Court has provided little clear guidance about what review should
look like. On the one hand, for example, it noted in State v. Carter77 that
there is no reversible error if the trial court does not increase the sentence
72. Id. at 741 (citation omitted).
73. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-401 (2006).
74. See
Tennessee‘s
―Official‖
Blakely
Fix,
Sentencing
Law
&
Policy,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2005/03/tennessees_offi.html (Mar. 3,
2005, 16:23 CST).
75. 549 U.S. 270, 294 (2007). In State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 649–50 (Tenn. 2005), the
state supreme court relied on Booker to argue that the pre-2005 guidelines were constitutional,
focusing on the fact that the federal guidelines were mandatory (if a judge found an aggravating fact
he was required to adjust the sentence accordingly) while Tennessee‘s were more optional (judicial
fact-finding was necessary for aggravation, but did not compel it). The U.S. Supreme Court held this
reading incorrect in California v. Cunningham. But Gomez and Cunningham had little to do with
Tennessee‘s post-Blakely guidelines, and instead were focused on whether pre-reform sentences
needed to be corrected because of constitutional defects.
76. In Carter, the state supreme court referred to this change as ―significant.‖ Given that few
cases appeared to have been resolved along these lines before Blakely and Booker, it is not so clear to
me that this is actually all that important.
77. 254 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2008).
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despite finding aggravators or declines to reduce it despite finding mitigators.
But on the other hand, it went out of its way to assert that the appellate courts
should make sure that the trial courts comply with the ―purposes of
punishment‖ set forth in the Tennessee Code.78 Given that Tennessee
includes among the theories of punishment just deserts, deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and restitution—like 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), all
the major theories of punishment—this opens the door to meaningful
substantive review. 79
Though the two states constitutionalized their guidelines differently, the
state of post-reform appellate review in both jurisdictions is remarkably
similar. In both states, appellate courts have viewed the reforms as restoring,
albeit in a weaker form, the boundary maintenance that they engaged in
before Blakely, precisely contrary to the lesson Bibas and Klein draw from
Booker. And as a result, the review they (re)establish ends up being
procedural. Where boundary maintenance is the norm, states need to view
Booker as revamping, not restoring, appellate review procedures. The
appellate courts in New Jersey and Tennessee thus mistakenly look
backwards, not forwards.
Consider the few relevant post-Natale decisions from New Jersey. 80
Appellate courts continue to cite Roth—the 1984 state supreme court case that
established New Jersey‘s boundary maintenance conditions—and other preBlakely cases as if nothing has changed; so too does the state supreme court. 81
In State v. Schuster, in fact, the court cites Roth and Natale side by side. And
even the courts that do not cite Roth by name follow it in spirit, engaging in
the clear, precise factor-by-factor analysis that defines boundary maintenance
and distinguishes it from the muddy regulatory review embraced by Bibas and
Klein.82
A similar pattern emerges in Tennessee. Given that the 2005 amendments
78. Id. at 344 n.10.
79. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-102 (2006).
80. Almost every single Westlaw-available appellate sentencing opinion from New Jersey
issued since Natale focuses on retroactivity issues arising from applying Natale to crimes committed
prior to the case. Only a handful of cases are ―pure‖ post-Natale cases not raising issues of
retroactivity.
81. See, e.g., State v. Schuster, No. A-5388-06T4, 2008 WL 4809497, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Nov. 6, 2008); State v. Robinson, No. A-1918-06T4, 2008 WL 398299, at *5–6 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 15, 2008). In State v. Cassady, 966 A.2d 473, 482 (N.J. 2009), the New
Jersey Supreme Court quoted State v. Roth, 471 A.2d 370, 387 (N.J. 1984), for the principle that as
long as the boundary is properly crossed, appellate review will not disturb the sentence: ―[w]hen
conscientious trial judges exercise discretion in accordance with the principles set forth in the Code
and defined by us . . . , they need fear no second-guessing‖ (alteration and omission in original).
82. See, e.g., State v. Tilelli, No. A-3135-05T1, 2008 WL 833752, at *8–9 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Mar. 31, 2008); Robinson, 2008 WL 398299, at *8; State v. Arnold, No. A-1921-06T4,
2008 WL 190439, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 24, 2008).
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rejected regulatory review, this should not come as a surprise. Appellate
courts continue to focus on the validity of individual findings and explicitly
refuse to evaluate the balancing that takes place. 83 And as in New Jersey,
Tennessee‘s supreme and appellate courts continue to cite pre-Blakely cases to
explain post-Booker decisions. 84
But these efforts at boundary maintenance fail. While the appellate courts
never explicitly acknowledge this, their decisions reflect the impossibility of
the task they have undertaken. In short, boundary maintenance in a postBooker world turns into nothing more than procedural review. The Tennessee
case of State v. Guy lays bare the hollowness of post-Blakely boundary
maintenance. In Guy, the appellate court struck two of the six aggravating
factors found by the trial judge yet upheld the sentence, stating: ―Although the
court improperly applied two enhancing factors, we nonetheless conclude that
the sentences imposed are appropriate. The record reflects that in determining
the specific sentence length, the trial court considered [relevant sources of
evidence], as well as the required principles of sentencing . . . .‖85 In other
words, as long as the trial judge jumps through the required procedural
hoops—as long as he thinks about the necessary sources of evidence and
theories of punishment—improper application of the guidelines generally
results in the sentence being upheld.
That is not to say that review, at least in Tennessee, is wholly toothless.
Even procedural review can have some punch. Consider State v. Bible, which
appears to be the only available opinion to adjust a sentence since the 2005
amendments. The appellate court held that the trial court had improperly used
an aggravator, and it noted that the trial court had stated in its sentencing
report that it had put great weight on that factor when deciding to aggravate
the defendant‘s sentence. As a result of this error, the appellate court reduced
the sentence, rather than remanding for resentencing. Despite appearances,
this is not substantive boundary maintenance. The appellate court was not
saying that the invalid factor was required to impose a greater sentence.
Instead, the appellate court took the trial court at its word that the invalid
aggravator was critical to its decision and adjusted the sentence accordingly.
83. See, e.g., State v. Carter, No. M2007-02706-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1349206, at *7 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 14, 2009); State v. Guy, No. E2007-01827-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 5130729, at *8
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2008); State v. Bible, No. M2007-02489-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL
5234755, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2008).
84. For example, in State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 346 (Tenn. 2008), the court cited a 1998
case, State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904 app. at 926–27 (Tenn. 1998), to justify a highly deferential (i.e.,
nonregulatory) standard of review. And in State v. Huffman, No. M2007-02103-CCA-R3-CD, 2009
WL 1349223, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2009), the appellate court relied on a 1995 case
(State v. Hayes, 899 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)) that cited a case from 1986 (State v.
Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1986)).
85. Guy, 2008 WL 5130729, at *12.
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Thus, the outcome in Bible has no implications for future cases—a subsequent
case identical to Bible in every way except for a different sentencing
statement would likely not result in resentencing—but it nonetheless
exemplifies meaningful procedural review.
Post-Natale review in New Jersey appears to be even more procedural
than that in Tennessee. As mentioned above, very few Westlaw-available
cases in New Jersey involve issues other than the retroactive application of
Natale. Of these, none appears to lead to a remand due to sentencing error,
and none even holds that a particular aggravator is unsupported by the record.
Indicative of post-Natale review in New Jersey is Robinson, in which the
appellate court demonstrated that the aggravating factors on which the trial
court relied were supported by the record and then tersely concluded: ―The
trial judge properly reviewed the record, made findings regarding the
applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, and then balanced those factors.
The record supports the judge‘s conclusion that the aggravating factors
substantially outweighed the mitigating.‖86 The second sentence seems to
suggest room for more substantive, meaningful review, but in the context of
the rest of the opinion and the other appellate and supreme court sentencing
decisions, it is clear that the first sentence is the key one. Once the trial court
has fulfilled its procedural obligations, there is little a boundary-maintenance
appellate court can do.
The experiences in New Jersey and Tennessee thus provide partial support
for Bibas and Klein‘s proposal. If a jurisdiction attempts to preserve
boundary maintenance, it will fail. Whatever the defects of Bibas and Klein‘s
proposal, their form of regulatory review appears to be the only option
available. Of course, that boundary maintenance cannot work does not
necessarily imply that regulatory review will. Evidence from Indiana,
however, fills this gap and suggests that in fact regulatory review can (at least
politically and legally) survive Booker.
Before turning to Indiana, however, I just want to stress that procedural
review is not synonymous with ineffectual review. Bible alone demonstrates
its potential efficacy. Furthermore, as Michael O‘Hear points out in this
symposium, simply asking judges to explain themselves—and ensuring that
they do so—can shape the sentences they impose. 87 Certainly a cynical endsoriented judge can write an explanation to justify (almost) any sentence, but I
would imagine that most judges take guideline suggestions seriously, and
being forced to explain themselves, or go through other procedural hurdles,
will likely influence their decision-making processes and thus the sentences
86. Robinson, 2008 WL 398299, at *8.
87. Michael O‘Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning from the Wisconsin
and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751 (2009).
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they impose.
B. Indiana’s (Accidental) Post-Booker Success
Unlike their counterparts in New Jersey and Tennessee, appellate courts in
Indiana have been able to continue to engage in meaningful review after
Booker. The reason, however, is more historical accident than intentional
planning. Indiana implemented both boundary maintenance and the type of
regulatory review advocated by Bibas and Klein well before the Supreme
Court issued Booker. As in New Jersey and Tennessee, post-Booker
boundary maintenance has been reduced to purely procedural (and
perfunctory) review. Regulatory review, however, has survived unscathed. In
fact, Indiana courts have maintained regulatory review without even
mentioning any possible tension with Blakely or Booker. So while they have
not explicitly adopted Bibas and Klein‘s reasoning, they appear to have done
so implicitly (and perhaps unintentionally).
Indiana was among the first states to implement a presumptive sentencing
system, adopting its regime in 1976. Indiana‘s code established a specific
presumptive sentence for each class of crime as well as upper and lower
bounds; trial courts could depart from presumptive sentences only if they
found aggravating or mitigating factors.88 Like those in New Jersey and
Tennessee, Indiana‘s guidelines provided for appellate review, establishing an
―abuse of discretion‖ standard that was essentially used for boundary
maintenance. 89
But Indiana also developed a second type of review derived from its state
constitution, one that pre-dated the guidelines. In the wake of constitutional
amendments in 1970, Indiana adopted what is now Appellate Rule 7(B),
which allows a court to revise an otherwise valid sentence if ―after due
consideration of the trial court‘s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.‖90 While the guidelines‘ abuse of discretion review targeted
procedural errors, Rule 7(B) review adopted a more substantive, Bibas-andKlein-like approach. 91
88. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-3 to 35-50-2-7, 35-38-1-7.1 (LexisNexis 2009); see also
Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 683 (Ind. 2005).
89. See, e.g., Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind. 2002).
90. IND. R. APP. P. 7(B) (2009); see also Randall T. Shepard, Robust Appellate Review of
Sentences: Just How British Is Indiana?, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 671 (2009); Joel M. Schumm, Recent
Developments in Indiana Criminal Law and Procedure, 36 IND. L. REV. 1003, 1025 (2003). Prior to
amendments in 2003, the standard was ―manifestly unreasonable,‖ not the less-deferential
―inappropriate.‖ See Ketcham v. State, 780 N.E.2d 1171, 1182 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Lewis v.
State, 759 N.E.2d 1077, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
91. Joel M. Schumm, Recent Developments in Indiana Criminal Law and Procedure, 41 IND.
L. REV. 955, 963–64 (2008).
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Both standards of review were fairly deferential, and appellate courts
generally upheld most sentences prior to Blakely. Yet both prongs of review
did yield some remands (under the abuse of discretion review) and
resentencings (under Rule 7(B)). Abuse of discretion remands paralleled
reversals in New Jersey and Tennessee, with appellate courts finding that trial
courts had failed to properly explain or justify their use of at least one or more
aggravating factors.92 Rule 7(B) reversals often resulted in the appellate court
adjusting the sentence directly, though under special circumstances the
appellate court would remand the case for resentencing. 93
State v. Jordan makes clear the difference between the two types of
review. Though the appellate court held that the trial court improperly found
some aggravators, the appellate court appeared inclined to uphold the
sentence based on the guidelines alone. In other words, the trial court had
permission to cross the boundary.94 But the court nonetheless reduced the
sentence under Rule 7(B) from twenty years (the maximum) to fifteen years,
arguing that while the offense justified the imposed sentence, offender
characteristics rendered the maximum sentence inappropriate.
Jordan illuminates the distinction between boundary maintenance and
regulatory review, and it also highlights the key concern with the latter type of
review. Regulatory review allows an appellate court to adjust a sentence that
is perfectly legal but somehow unappealing to the appellate judges. This can
be problematic. On the one hand, such review may allow appellate judges to
rein in excessive sentences. On the other hand, it seems inconsistent with
guideline goals such as transparency and uniformity, especially since the
appellate court has less information at its disposal than the trial judge. 95

92. See, e.g., Meadows v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1112, 1126–27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Cox v. State,
780 N.E.2d 1150, 1158–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Powell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 311, 318 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001).
93. For example, the appellate court adjusted a twenty-year sentence down to fifteen years in
Jordan v. State, 787 N.E.2d 993, 997 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), but it remanded in Lewis, 759 N.E.2d at
1087. See also Schumm, supra note 90, at 1031 n.242.
94. Not all the aggravators were improper, and the court pointed to state supreme court
precedent holding that the trial court need find only a single aggravator to justify imposing the
maximum sentence. Jordan, 787 N.E.2d at 997 (citing Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 932 (Ind.
1999)).
95. It is worth pointing out here that the debates about ―uniformity‖ or ―disparity‖ in sentencing
decisions and scholarly works are distressingly incomplete. Almost without fail the term ―disparity‖
is invoked without any clarifying explanation. But as Kevin Cole has pointed out, despite the way it
is used by judges and academics alike, ―disparity‖ has no inherent meaning. Kevin Cole, The Empty
Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (1997). What is disparate to a
retributivist need not be disparate to a rehabilitationist: a retributivist would disagree with sentencing
a twenty-year-old offender differently than a forty-year-old one for the same crime, although an
incapacitationist—taking into account the literature on desistance—may view imposing the same
sentence as disparate.
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Since Blakely, Indiana has modified its abuse of discretion review, but not
its Rule 7(B) review. The Indiana Supreme Court held that Blakely
invalidated its sentencing guidelines and demanded that required facts be
found by juries. 96 The Indiana legislature, however, speedily amended its
guidelines to make them voluntary. Whether it Booker-ized them or made
them wholly advisory was less clear: After the amendments, Indiana appellate
courts were unsure of their exact role with respect to the guidelines.97 In
Anglemyer v. State, the state supreme court made it clear that the guidelines
had been Booker-ized, and thus that appellate review had been retained. The
supreme court held that appellate courts would still review sentences under
the same abuse of discretion standard, noting that ―[n]othing in the amended
statutory regime changes this standard.‖98 Tellingly—and akin to what
happened in New Jersey and Tennessee as well—the court relied on several
pre-Blakely cases to explain the nature of post-Booker abuse of discretion
review. 99 More provocative, however, was its discussion of Rule 7(B): It
treated Rule 7(B) as if nothing had changed. 100
By now, it should be easy to predict the nature of Indiana‘s post-Booker
abuse of discretion review: it is almost wholly procedural and perfunctory.
To the extent that there are remands, they appear to be solely for failures to
properly explain sentences.101 Again, such review need not be toothless, since
forcing a judge to explain himself may cause him to think more carefully
about the sentence he is imposing. But it is a mild form of review.
More interesting is the continued vitality of Rule 7(B) review. This type
of regulatory review appears to be as robust as ever—in fact, perhaps more so,
ever since amendments in 2003 lessened appellate deference. 102 In Cardwell
v. State, for example, the Indiana Supreme Court reduced a defendant‘s
sentence under Rule 7(B), despite holding that the trial court did not abuse its
96. Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 686 (Ind. 2005).
97. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 488–89 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Gibson v. State, 856
N.E.2d 142, 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).
98. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490.
99. The court cites Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. 2002), Page v. State, 424 N.E.2d
1021 (Ind. 1981), and In re LJM, 473 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
100. In particular, the court discusses Anglemyer‘s Rule 7(B) claim without a single mention of
Blakely or Booker. ―See‖ (in the negative) Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491–94.
101. In Powell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), for example, the court
defines ―abuse of discretion‖ as either not providing a sentencing statement or relying on aggravating
or mitigating factors not supported by the record. As long as the factors are supported, the court
appears to take a hands-off approach. Eversole v. State, 873 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
makes this clear: ―[W]here the trial court has entered a reasonably detailed sentencing statement
explaining its reasons for a given sentence that is supported by the record, we may only review the
sentence through Appellate Rule 7(B).‖
102. See Stewart v. State, 866 N.E.2d 858, 865 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Schumm, supra note 91,
at 967–70.
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discretion in setting the sentence. 103 That such a move took place at the state
supreme court, without any mention of possible Blakely problems, indicates
that the Indiana Supreme Court has implicitly adopted the Bibas and Klein
view of what constitutes acceptable review in a post-Booker world.
The results in Indiana thus suggest that the Bibas and Klein proposal is a
politically and legally viable way for appellate review to survive Booker.
Boundary maintenance fails in Indiana (as well as in New Jersey and
Tennessee), but the blurry regulatory review that Bibas and Klein propose has
survived. And absent some sort of intervention from the U.S. Supreme
Court—which seems unlikely, given recent decisions cabining Blakely‘s
reach—it is apparently good law.

103. 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1226 (Ind. 2008).
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IV. LOOKING FORWARD: IS BOOKER REVIEW A GOOD THING?
At present, Booker‘s efforts to revitalize appellate review have essentially
failed. But Bibas and Klein point to a possible route states can follow to
develop a more rigorous type of review, and Indiana‘s experiences suggest
that it is viable. In this Part, I want to turn away from doctrinal and
constitutional issues and briefly consider whether this path is a normatively
appealing one for states to take. That many states adopted presumptive
guidelines rather than voluntary suggests that they specifically believed
appellate review was important, and thus that its elimination by Blakely is
undesirable. 104 It is not immediately clear, however, that the type of review
permitted by Booker is an appealing way to fill the gap.
The tradeoffs are easy to establish. On the one hand, Bibas–Klein review
allows appellate courts to police particularly extreme sentencing decisions by
trial judges. But on the other hand, this enforcement power works only if it is
opaque, subjective, and individualistic105—contrary to guideline goals of
transparency, objectivity, and consistency, and much more vulnerable to
misuse or even abuse. Moreover, the federal experience suggests that the
doctrinal ambiguity of meaningful Booker review leads to a substantial
amount of costly litigation and uncertainty about what exactly trial courts
must do and appellate courts can do. 106
Unfortunately, there is very little empirical evidence available to resolve
this debate. We can, however, at least flesh out the questions that must be
answered and consider what the few available findings suggest. The two
central questions are: (1) Given the range of internal and external pressures
that may induce trial judges to adhere to guidelines (such as personal senses
of obligation, greater public accountability, institutional pressures, and so on),
how important is appellate review in general?; and (2) What are the marginal
benefits of substantive review over procedural review? The more closely
outcomes in voluntary guideline systems track those in presumptive guideline
systems, and the more procedural review appears to be as effective as
104. Joanna Shepherd argues that presumptive guidelines were correlated with higher crime
rates and thus a ―silver lining‖ of Blakely was that it undid sentencing policies that hurt crimefighting efforts. Even accepting that the correlation is causal, however, does not mean that Blakely
benefited the affected states. These states may have made the rational decision to divert limited
resources from criminal justice to other state functions, such as public health or education, accepting
higher crime rates as the necessary cost. If so, Blakely may force them to ―purchase‖ reduced crime
rates they did not want to buy. See Joanna Shepherd, Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines,
Judicial Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 533 (2007).
105. After all, appellate opinions violate Blakely if they define clear rules.
106. That New Jersey and Tennessee have not seen extensive litigation over these issues is
most likely the result of these states not really adopting substantive review after Booker. That
Indiana has had no apparent debate about this issue, at least as it pertains to Rule 7(B), is harder to
explain; perhaps there are simply not enough Rule 7(B) adjustments to generate sufficient attention.
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substantive review, the more states can use (truly) voluntary guidelines or
procedural review to accomplish the goals of presumptive guidelines without
having to risk the potential costs of the Bibas–Klein approach.
There does not appear to be any research at all yet addressing the second
question. A few studies, however, shed some light on the first. These explore
the relative effects of voluntary and presumptive guidelines, and their
evidence is mixed. Voluntary guidelines appear to be better than no
guidelines at all, but presumptive guidelines similarly seem to tie trial judges‘
hands more than voluntary guidelines.
My own work, for example, indicates that sentences are more consistent,
and that the race and sex of the defendant appear to influence sentencing
outcomes less, in presumptive guideline jurisdictions compared to voluntary
guideline ones, although voluntary guidelines are better than no guidelines at
all.107 And a study by Thomas Marvell similarly suggests that appellate
review may matter, since he finds that prison population growth is slower in
states with presumptive guidelines than with voluntary guidelines; though
again, voluntary guidelines are better than no guidelines.108 Both of these
studies thus suggest that something is lost when appellate review is
eliminated, and so—despite its logical and doctrinal defects—there may be
some merit to trying to follow in Booker‘s footsteps. But saying more than
this is difficult. The question remains whether the apparent marginal gains of
appellate review are worth whatever costs Bibas–Klein review would
introduce.
Assessing the importance of appellate review is further confounded by a
significant empirical blind spot. There is almost no evidence on how changes
in jury rights (such as the holdings in Blakely and Booker) affect plea
bargains—despite the fact that pleas resolve approximately 91% of all
107. See Pfaff, supra note 11, at 274–76.
108. Thomas B. Marvell, Sentencing Guidelines and Prison Population Growth, 85 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 696, 701–02, 707 (1995). Indicative of a general challenge in law and criminology
of classifying guidelines, Marvell purports to study only presumptive guidelines, on the grounds that
voluntary guidelines likely have little or no effect. But two of the states he classifies as
presumptive—Delaware and Wisconsin—are in fact voluntary. Moreover, like almost all students of
structured sentencing, he excludes those states that used determinate sentencing laws instead of
presumptive guidelines, despite the fact that the difference is purely semantic. See Pfaff, supra note
11, at 274–76.
Note too that the causal story in Marvell‘s paper is tricky. States do not randomly adopt
voluntary or presumptive guidelines: there is a reason for each state‘s choice. States more committed
to reducing prison population growth may have adopted presumptive guidelines to exert more control
over judges. If other forces that rein in prison growth are correlated with this choice, at least some of
the reported effect of presumptive guidelines may be spurious. Moreover, Marvell‘s results should
be viewed with some caution due to other statistical limitations that I discuss in John F. Pfaff, The
Empirics of Prison Growth: A Critical Review and Path Forward, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
547, 549 (2008).
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criminal cases (compared to 5% for bench trials, with jury trials comprising
the remaining 4% of dispositions). With little understanding of how
defendants and prosecutors bargain in the shadow of any one sentencing
regime, it is nearly impossible to predict how they respond to changes in
regimes. 109
Right now, then, the available evidence is slight, but it at least suggests
that there was a cost to Blakely, and thus some potential gross (though not
necessarily net) benefit to Booker‘s attempted repeal. In a few years, better
answers to these questions will emerge. Empirically, Blakely has the
advantage of being an exogenous shock to sentencing practices, which will
make it much easier to address these issues. 110 By randomly eliminating
appellate review from many states, Blakely will help illuminate its
importance. Moreover, the regimes currently used in New Jersey and
Tennessee may shed some light on the effectiveness of procedural review.
Right now, however, there is simply not enough post-Blakely, post-Booker,
post-Tennessee-reform-act, post-Natale, post-Anglemyer data to be able to
extract any meaningful conclusions.

109. Theory cannot provide much guidance, unfortunately. As Stephanos Bibas points out,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, defendants, and judges are subject to a host of competing incentives
and biases, many of which cut in contradictory or ambiguous directions. Jury sentencing hearings
are time-intensive, for example, so Blakely-izing guidelines may induce the prosecutor to offer a
better plea, but may likewise force an overworked defense attorney to accept a worse deal. Bookerization, by eliminating the need for a jury, would have opposite effects. (And the game theory
implications are actually far more complex, since the prosecutor and defense attorney are likely
aware of these incentive effects and may try to game them.) Or, comparing again a Blakely world to
a Booker one, defendants may overstate the likelihood of a jury ―acquittal‖ on aggravators and thus
be less willing to take a plea (or demand better terms), but a jury may be less predictable which could
make a risk-averse defense attorney more likely to encourage his client to take it. See Stephanos
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
110. Supreme Court decisions are a perhaps undervalued source of exogenous variation. The
timing and nature of Court decisions can often be uncorrelated with state-level variables of interest.
A good example of an interesting study exploiting this trait of Court decisions is Raymond A. Atkins
& Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of
the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J. L. & ECON. 157, 158 (2003). Atkins and Rubin note that at the time of
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which constitionalized the exclusionary rule, half the states
already had such a rule and half did not. Thus, Mapp provides a tidy experiment: the half with the
rule already act as a control group for the other half, which at that point effectively received a
randomized treatment. This is perhaps as close to an observational randomized clinical trial as one
can hope for. In a few years, when more data are available, Blakely will do for sentencing what
Mapp did for the exclusionary rule.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Booker, the Supreme Court awkwardly attempted to restore the
substantive appellate review of criminal sentences after effectively destroying
such review less than a year earlier in Blakely. The result is confusing and
contradictory, since the Court attempted this restoration while simultaneously
upholding its decision in Blakely. Nonetheless, at least three states have
waded into Booker‘s logical quicksand.
Their experiences are informative. Booker appears to restore at least some
substantive review, but not the type states had traditionally encouraged their
courts to undertake before Blakely. Booker does not restore boundary
maintenance review, in which appellate courts ensure that trial courts follow
the dictates of the guidelines. But it does revitalize a form of regulatory
review, in which appellate courts review the substantive judgment of the trial
courts. Reversals under such an approach, however, appear to be rare,
suggesting that Booker authorizes review only at the very edges of trial court
discretion, at least at the state level. It thus fails to meaningfully restore
appellate review, and the review it does reestablish raises significant
normative concerns.
It remains to be seen what will be the effects of Blakely and of Booker‘s
failure to indirectly repeal it. At present, there are simply insufficient data to
make any meaningful predictions, but we can at least identify the two key
questions that must be answered: does appellate review (as opposed to other
guideline-created constraints) matter, and if so, does regulatory review induce
more compliance than procedural review? With the passage of time, we will
be able to map out more fully whether Booker‘s failure is a minor
inconvenience or a serious blow to states that want structured sentencing.

